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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dramatically in-creases the likelihood of operating in “hostile” environments, thereby eliminating the civil reserve airfleet’s contribution to strategic airlift. Commercial airlift aircraft, built for efficiency, represent a fiscally responsible complement to the military’s airlift fleet. In order to meet current and future force requirements, especially with a continental-based force structure, the United States needs to supplement its strategic airlift fleet with a COTS airlift aircraft....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 THE CIVILIAN–MILITARY AIRLIFT PARTNERSHIP: EFFICIENCY VERSUS EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS, CURRENT CAPABILITIES, AND THE SHORTFALL . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 4 THE ALTERNATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58...

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The Air Force has challenged leaders to integrate and use quality principles as a way to improve operations throughout the service. In this study Lt Col David F. Bird, USAF, reminds us that these quality principles apply to emergency response forces, both before and during a crisis. He proposes that senior leaders view quality concepts and principles as a way of creating an environment to spark the highest performance by their subordinates and not as giving up authority or control....

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"Colonel Cirafici provides a clear picture of theater air mobility forces structure, their capabilities, and limitations . He has identified problem areas, and recommended improve ments. Colonel Cirafici has looked to the future and examined how ongoing changes in theater air mobility forces and equipment will increase the combatant commander's options in the theater. The greatest value of his study is to create a clearer understanding of how theater air mobility forces act to enhance operations and support the battlefield."...

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This book examines the role that theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO played in influencing the use of airpower over Bosnia between the spring of 1993 and the end of 1995. It also uncovers factors explaining why top UN and NATO commanders in the region acted as they did. The central thesis of this study is that the commanders’ needs to balance the various responsibilities inherent in command powerfully affected their actions when they tried to influence the use of airpower....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3 BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA: 1992–APRIL 1993 . . . . . . . . . .57 4 NATO AIR SUPPORT AND AIR STRIKES: MAY–DECEMBER 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5 AIRPOWER THREATS, USES, AND DISAPPOINTMENTS: JANUARY–JUNE 1994 . .115 6 COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDS FOR FORCE PROTECTION: AUGUST–DECEMBER 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 7 PAVING THE WAY TO ENFORCEMENT: JANUARY–JUNE 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .203 8 SREBRENICA AND THE DECISIONS TO USE AIRPOWER: JULY–AUGUST 1995 . . 245 9 DELIBERATE FORCE: AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 10 CONCLUSIONS: MILITARY INFLUENCE ON AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA . . . . . . . . . . . . 313...

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This study answers the following questions: Is John A. Warden III’s, “The Enemy as a System” analogous to the Air Corps Tactical School’s (ACTS) industrial web theory of airpower employment? If so, why (given the 50 plus years between development of these theories)? If not, what are the prime sources of divergence? The author first describes both theories using an outline from which they are compared on an “apples to apples” basis. From this analysis, similarities and differences are presented. Next, the author discusses contextual factors affecting development of both theories....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 THEORY DESCRIPTIONS AND COMPARISON . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 15 3 ANALYSIS OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 30 4 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 36 GLOSSARY . . . . 37...

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In this paper, Lt Col Devin L. Cate tackles the question of whether an air superiority fighter is relevant to warfare in the twenty-first century.

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This study examines the development of military night aviation from its origins through the First World War. Emphasis is on the evolution of night flying in those countries which fought on the Western Front, namely France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States . While night flying occurred in other theaters, the most intense air effort was clearly in t°he west. There, belligerents pressed aviation technology and tactics to the limits ; the skies of northern France and Flanders offered the only opportunity for movement across the stagnated front. Another important consideration was the availability of rich documentation concerning night aerial activity in the theater....

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The early proponents of air power believed that with suitable aircraft, and control of the air, airmen would make surface operations impossible and irrelevant. In the years since they made these predictions, aircraft have gained capabilities far beyond those predicted by early advocates. However, airmen are still searching for a strategy that will guarantee the results their predecessors promised. Instead of replacing surface forces, air power has become their indispensable partner. Air power contributes to the security, mobility, and firepower of joint forces, but its primary contribution may be air superiority....

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This paper examines how these rules affected the effective military execution of the Rolling Thunder air campaign, as well as their impact on American aircrews and the enemy. During the Vietnam War, many American air commanders were convinced that rigid Rules of Engagement (ROEs) prevented an American aerial victory over North Vietnam during the Rolling Thunder air campaign from 1965-1968. ROEs became so complicated and changed so often that aircrews found it difficult to know what the rules were from day to day. As a result, many vital military targets were either not bombed or were attacked in a very limited and piecemeal fashion....

Table of Contents Details
1. INTRODUCTION. 1 2. BACKGRIDUND INFORMATION. 3 3. IMPACT OF ROEs ON MILITARY COMMANDERS AND AIRCREWS. 12 4. ROLLINIG THUNDER --MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. 20 5. IMPACT OF ROEs ON THE ENEMY. 27 6. CONCLUSIONS. 32...

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This is a study of the applicability of prospect theory to military decision making.Prospect theory posits that the decision maker’s reference point determines thedomain in which he makes a decision. One implication of this study is that if the decision maker can do the same for asubordinate or for an enemy, he may be better able to predict their responses in agiven situation. The project’s goal is to develop a framework for assessing riskpropensity. It does this by first describing the military decision-making process andconcluding that it is a rational decision-making process. Second, this study describesprospect theory and matches the key aspects of the theory with the militarydecision-making process. Third, it proposes a framework for assessing riskpropensity. The theory is tested in a case study of Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1944decision to launch Operation Market Garden. This decision is analyzed in terms ofGraham T. Allison’s three models for decision making and prospect theory todetermine which model or theory seems to provide the best explanations for Eisenhower’s decision....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 MILITARY DECISION MAKING AND PROSPECT THEORY. . . . 5 MARKET GARDEN: CALCULATED RISK OR FOOLISH GAMBLE? . . . . 19 APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK . . . . 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 47...

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According to CMSgt Cari Kent, 30th Space Wing command chief, it is at basic training that Airmen learn everything they need to succeed in the Air Force.1 In recent incidents, Airmen have exhibited unacceptable actions. These range from transporting cruise missiles loaded with warheads from Minot to Barksdale AFB in 2007 and erroneously shipping nuclear-missile fuses to Taiwan in 2006, to other lesser-known infractions in the Air Force. Certainly, the remedy to such attitudes and behaviors could not be simply applying lessons learned at basic training. Or could the application of the basics taught to initial trainees have changed the course of some of these events? What do Airmen experience at basic training that leads the chief to this conclusion?...

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Minelaying by the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) had to overcome the absence of doctrine, serious questions of service autonomy, and preconceptions about naval and air force traditional roles. Though this initially unappreciated weapon gained considerable acceptance during the years of World War II, mines were not again dropped from aircraft in combat until the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force gave little effort to its collateral maritime missions until concern grew over containing an expanding Soviet naval threat. Today, Air Force capabilities for aerial minelaying and other naval missions remain an important (though little appreciated) means for projecting long-range air power in support of "Global Reach--Global Power."...

Table of Contents Details
1. MINE WARFARE..................3 Theory and History Mines and How They Worked 2. WORLD WAR II AERIAL MINELAYING IN EUROPE............7 First Use by Germany The Royal Air Force Fights Back 3. MINELAY’ING IN JAPAN’S "OUTER ZONE" -1942-1945............10 Early Plans and Capability U.S. Navy Submarine and Surface Laid Mines Air Operations Minelaying by Naval Aviation 4. AAF MINELAYING IN JAPAN/S "INNER ZONE" -1945...............18 Planning "Operation Starvation LeMay and the XXI Bomber Command 5. PLAN AND REALITY -THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AAF AERIAL MINELAYING............26 Plans and Opportunities “Outer Zone" Results “Inner Zone" Results Japanese Mine Countermeasures World War II Conclusions 6. AERIAL MINELAYING -AN AIR FORCE MISSION............31 Contributions of the Army Air Forces Mines and the Postwar Air Force Mines in Three Limited Wars The Lessons -Are They Learned? Applications in the Future Conclusion...

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I set a goal of utilizing primary sources as the basis for this paper. I wanted to research what the key players wrote or said at the time or later in their memoirs. But, in addition to finding information relevant to this thesis....